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sume that they are in the best position to detect disloyalty, and that they will
be alert to the danger of seditious persons in the schools. It is more for the
regents, the courts, and the legislatures, with whom the ultimate safeguarding
of liberty rests, to guard against the schools becoming forums for partisan political maneuvering.
If it is the common report that our schools are infiltrated with "subversive
persons" it is also the common report that the schools face a crisis in giving
Americans the education they must have. If they are to meet that crisis, not
only the physical problems of buildings and finance must be solved, but the
problem of personnel must be conquered. A pattern of constant testing of teachers for political innocuousness is hardly likely to draw the sort of teacher who
would imbue children with a vigorous love of justice, democratic principles, or
country.
Socrates, answering the common report that he was a subversive and a corrupter of youth, said of one of his accusers: "He says that I am a doer of evil
and corrupt the youth, but I say to men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of
evil in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest and is so eager
to bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest in matters in which he
really never had the smallest interest."58

RAILROAD LABOR DISPUTES AND THE NATIONAL
RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
In two cases decided in the spring of 195o,' the Supreme Court, by a new
construction of the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act (RLA),2 conferred upon the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) exclusive primary jurisdiction of disputes involving the interpretation and application of
collective-bargaining agreements in the railroad industry. The effect of these
decisions is to deny parties to the disputes initial resort to state and federal
courts, and to limit judicial consideration of these controversies mainly to suits
in federal courts for the enforcement of NRAB awards. This holding invites a
closer scrutiny of the NRAB's internal operation and its relation to the system
of collective bargaining in the railroad industry.
I
The courts have come to regard collective-bargaining agreements as contracts which may be enforced by any employee who is covered by them,3 regard"5Plato, Apology, Works of Plato 67 (Mod. Lib. ed., 1928).
1Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (i95o); Order of Ry. Conductors v.

Southern R. Co., 339 U.S. 255 (195o).
244 Stat.

577 (X926), as amended, 48 Stat. ir85 (I934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 (i943).

3 An early difficulty with the suit to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement as a con-

tract was found by some courts in the lack of consideration from the individual employee who
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less of union affiliation.4 They freely allow complaints by individual employees,
and where other employees would be affected by a judgment sought against an
employer, the court will not only permit, but insist on, their being notified and
given an opportunity to be heard.' The courts have not limited their jurisdiction to disputes between management and employees. The rights-created by
bargaining agreements have also been protected against interference by other
employees,7 the bargaining agent itself,' and other unions.9 Protection has even
been given to an employment status not covered by an agreement, but which
would have been continued by the employer but for the outside interference
complained of.Io Although the availability of judicial relief is doubtful in some
types of disputes,1I judicial sanctions have been invoked to maintain every
brings the suit. He was not a party to the agreement and did not agree to serve under it.
Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913); West v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., xo3 W.Va. 417, 137 S.E. 654 (1927); Burnetta v. Marceline Coal
Co., i8o Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136 (i9o4). Also see Gary v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 37 Ga. App.
744, 4r S.E. 8r9 (i928), which permitted suit where the plaintiff's contract of employment
had incorporated the collective provision sued on. Some courts could see their way to enforcing wage and working condition provisions in the agreement, but balked at those restricting the employer's right to discharge at will because the employee was always free to quit.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W. 2d 749 (x936). In Gulla v. Barton, x64
App. Div. 293, x49 N.Y. Supp. 952 ,(914), the agreement was treated as a benefit to which the

plaintiff employee was entitled by virtue of having paid dues to the union which made it.
It was enforced as a contract to which the plaintiff was a real, though not a named party. As
now conceived, the agreement is not in itself a contract, but rather an offer, which becomes a
contract when an individual accepts it by taking employment which is covered by the agreement. See Illinois Central R. Co. v. Moore, 112 F. 2d 959 (C.A. 5 th, 1940).
4 Union members permitted to sue: Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N.Y. Supp. 952
(r9r4); Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N.E. 154 (1926); Piercy v. Louisville
& N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Auit, 157
Tenn. 461, 9 S.W. 2d 692 (1928). Nonunion employees allowed to sue on a union agreement:

Gregg v. Starks, i88 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (192o); Yazoo &M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard, 16i
Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (i93i); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, 64 F. 2d 902 (C.A. 5 th, 1933).
For a review of these and other early cases see Rentschler v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 126 Neb.
493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).
s Cases cited note 4 supra.
6 See note 74 infra.
7Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., io Miss. 147, 177 So. 509 (1937); Long v.
Van Osdale, 26 N.E. 2d 69 (Ind. App., 1946).
8
Piercy v. Louisville &N. Ry. Co., i98 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); Crowell v. Palmer,
134 Conn. 502, 58 A. 2d 729 (1948); Dooley v. Lehigh V. R. Co., i3o N.J. Eq. 75, 21 A. 2d 334
(i941); Capra v. Local Lodge No. 273, 102 Colo. 63, 76 P. 2d 738 (1938); System Federation
No. 9x v. Reed, iSo F. 2d 991 (C.A. 6th, 1950).
9Randolph v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 1007 (Mo., 1946), rev'd 164 F. 2d 4
(C.A. 8th, 1947); Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Slocum, 299 N.Y. 496, 87 N.E. 2d 532 (i949),
rev'd 339 U.S. 239 (ig5o); see Griffin v. Illinois Central R. Co., 88 F. Supp. 552 (Ill., 1949).
,0 Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 171 F. 2d 594 (C.A. 7th, 1948).

x Especially the jurisdictional dispute. See text at note 85 infra; Hampton v. Thompson,
171 F. 2d 535 (C.A. 5 th, 1948).
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aspect of collective bargaining. 1 In effect, the collective bargaining agreement
is enforced as the law of the employment relationship.'3
Collective bargaining in the railroad industry has received special treatment from Congress.4 In I926 the RLA' s imposed on the carriers the duty to
bargain collectively, and in 1934 Congress added criminal sanctions to this provision and set up machinery for election by each class or craft of its bargaining
representative.16 The 1934 amendments also provided for the establishment of
the NRAB,'7 to have jurisdiction over "disputes between an employee or group
of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions. .. ." The disputes "may be referred by petition of the
parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board
.." [emphasis added], in the event that preliminary conferences held on company property do not result in an adjustment.' 8
12E.g., cases cited notes 7, 8 and 9 supra; Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U.S. 515 (1937) (injunction requiring carrier to bargain with employees' elected repre-

sentative); Brand v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 22 F. Supp. 569 (Pa., 1938) (court has jurisdiction
to enjoin award of system board of adjustment which was made without notice or hearing to
plaintiffs); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 94 F. 2d 97 (C.A. 6th,
1937) (upheld refusal of injunction to enforce Mediation Board certification of collective
bargaining agent under RLA because not supported by evidence).
13This is a realistic view of the collective bargaining system as practiced in the railroad
industry. Under the RLA the members of a craft or class (determined by the National Mediation Board) elect a bargaining representative to conduct negotiations with the carrier for a
collective agreement. The whole class, including the minority which may have dissented from
the choice of representative, is bound by this agreement, regardless of whether or not they are
members of the chosen representative. Brisbin v. E. L. Oliver Lodge No. 335, 134 Neb. 517,
279 N.W. 277 (1938); Austin v. Southern Pacific Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 292, 123 P. 2d 39
(1942). Employees may escape the agreement only by quitting, an alternative which has little
attraction in view of the advantages of seniority already accrued and the difficulty of finding
new employment in the industry especially after the age of forty. See Austin v. Southern
Pacific R. Co., supra.
4 Government intervention began with the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1877 (24 Stat. 379) and the first arbitration legislation in 1888 (25 Stat. 5oI).
Activity was limited to development of arbitration and mediation techniques and occasional
strike-breaking until World War I. After the war the Railroad Labor Board was established
under the Transportation Act of 1920 (4i Stat. 469, 470) to make rules and setwages, but it had
no power to carry out any of its awards or mandates. It was replaced in 1926 by the Board of
Mediation created by the RLA (44 Stat. 579), which had no rule-making powers, but merely
provided a voluntary mediation and arbitration service. Adjustments under effective agreements were left to bipartisan boards to be created by private agreement between unions and
carriers, although the Board of Mediation could be asked to decide deadlocked cases. This
adjustment machinery proved unworkable, and amendments to the RLA in 1934, 48 Stat.
1i85, 45 U.S.C.A. § 15i (r943), established the NRAB as the mainspring of a new adjustment procedure and provided much needed sanctions against anti-union activities by the
carriers. See Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board-A Unique Administrative
Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567, 568-76 (i937); First Annual Report of the National Mediation
Board 59 (I935)I 544 Stat. 579, as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § xSi (I943).
16 § 2, 48 Stat. i85 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 (1943).
'7 Ibid., at § 3 and § 153.
18Ibid., at § 3 First (i) and § 153 First (i).
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The state courts generally maintained that this provision did not deprive
them of their pre-existing jurisdiction,'9 and the view was shared by some
federal courts with regard to both the state courts and federal diversity jurisdiction.20 However, the election of a forum, once made, was binding on the
parties.21 If the forum was the NRAB, the narrow review provisions of the RLLA
provided the only means of getting into court,22 unless the NRAB refused to
2
take the case.

3

The concurrent jurisdiction view was apparently accepted by the Supreme
Court in ig4o, in the case of Moore v. IllinoisCentralR. Co.,24 where an employee
sued in a state court for damages for wrongful discharge; the case then being
removed on the basis of diversity. The Court said that the administrative
9Explicit holding: Evans v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 19i Ga. 395, 12 S.E. 2d 61x (194o);
Watson v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 173 S.W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943); Southern Ry. Co. v.
Order of Ry. Conductors, 210 S.C. 121, 41 S.E. 2d 774 (1947), rev'd 339 U.S. 255 (1950);
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Slocum, 299 N.Y. 496, 87 N.E. 2d 532 (i949), rev'd 339 U.S. 239
(,95o). Treated case without comment: Dooley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 13o N.J. Eq. 75, 21 A.
2d 334 (1941); Moore v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 176 Miss. 65, 166 So. 395 (1936); Capra v.
LocalLodge No. 273, 102 Colo. 63,76 P. 2d 738 (1938). Contra: State exrel. St. Louis-S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Russell, 358 Mo. 1136, 219 S.W. 2d 34 o (1949); see Tharp v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
307 Ky. 322, 210 S.W. 2d 9S4 (1948); Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 135 Tex. 31, 137 S.W.
2d 997 (194o); cf. Wyatt v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., ioi S.W. 2d io82 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1937).
20 Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 63 F. Supp. 306 (S.C., .94S); Delaware, L.
& W. R. Co. v. Slocum, 56 F. Supp. 634 (N.Y., '944); Adams v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.,
121 F. 2d SoS (C.A. 7th, 194*); Swartz v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 44 F. Supp. 447 (N.Y., 1942);
Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 83 F. Supp. 722 (Pa., 1949); Washington Terminal Co.
v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235 (App. D.C., 1941). Contra: Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F. 2d 535
(C.A. 5th, 1948); Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. v. Randolph, 164 F. 2d 4 (C.A. 8th, 1947); McDermott v. New York Central R. Co., 32 F. Supp. 873 (N.Y., i94o); United States ex rel. Deavers
v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 171 F. 2d 96 (C.A. 5 th, 1949); In re Central R. Co. of N.J. [O.R.C.
v. Pitney], 145 F. 2d 351 (C.A. 3 d, 1944); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 83 F. Supp. 93o (Ill., 1949). Federal courts declined to accept nondiversity cases, stating
that the cause of action arose out of the common law, not the RLA. Cases cited pro, supra;
Malone v. Gardner, 62 F. 2d xS (C.A. 4 th, 1932) (pre-NRAB); Lewis v. New York Central R.
Co., X7 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 65,425 (D.C. Ill., 1949); Strawser v. Reading Co., 8o F. Supp. 455
(Pa., 1948).
21Kelly v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 7s F. Supp. 737 (Tenn., 1948); Washington Terminal
Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235 (App. D.C., 1941); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 75 F.
Supp. 740 (Ohio, 1948); Hicks v. Thompson, 207 S.W. 2d iooo (Tex. Civ. App., z948); Austin
v. Southern Pacific Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 292, 123 P. 2d 39 (1942); see Watson v. MissouriK.-T. R. Co., 173 S.W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943).
Reynoldsv. Denver& R.G. W.R. Co., 174 F. 2d673 (C.A. ioth, 1949); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. CO., 75 F. Supp. 740 (Ohio, 1948); Berryman v. Pullman CO., 48 F. Supp. 542
(Mo., 1942); Williams v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 356 Mo. 967, 204 S.W. 2d 693 (1947);
Hecox v. Pullman Co., 85 F. Supp. 34 (Wash., 1949); Hargis v. Wabash R. Co., 163 F. 2d 6o8
(C.A. 7 th, 1947); see dissenting opinion, Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 749
(1945). But see Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235, 245 (App. D.C., 1941);
Watson v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 173 S.W. 2d 357, 362 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943); opinion of
Holly, J., in Hargis v. Wabash R. Co., supra at 61x.
23 Crowell
24312

U.S.

v. Palmer, 134 Conn. S02, 58 A. 2d 729 (1948).

630

(g4o).
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remedies provided by the RLA, even the requirement of conferences on company property, need not be exhausted before resort is made to the courts. A
pronounced shift from the Moore case was evident in the Supreme Court's
1944 decision, Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney,2S in which a bankruptcy
court was confronted with a jurisdictional dispute between the plaintiff and the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, each union maintaining that its own contract covered certain disputed jobs. The Supreme Court ruled that the bankruptcy court should not attempt to interpret the contracts itself, but should retain jurisdiction of the dispute until the parties had an opportunity to consult
the NRAB for interpretation of the two agreements. It could then proceed to
protect the rights so revealed..
26
After this decision the state courts continued to dispose of cases in the field,'
but some federal courts instituted a policy of denying access to the federal courts
prior to a decision by the NRAB.27 This mandatory primary jurisdiction of the
NRAB has been further extended by the two recent cases of Slocum v. Delaware,
L. & W. R. Co.28 and Order of Railway Conductorsv. Southern Ry. Co.,29 in which
the Supreme Court sharply restricted the concurrent jurisdiction of both state
and federal courts. Both cases involved the interpretation of agreements, and
the Court was impressed with the desirability of having this done uniformly and
expertly. It stated that this objective, which was the basis of the Pitney decision,
"equally supports a denial of power in any court--state as well as federal-to
invade the jurisdiction conferred on the Adjustment Board by the [RLA]."30 It
should be noted that this jurisdiction is not limited to interpretations, but extends to all grievances and adjustments.3' Rather than overrule the Moore case,
U.S. 561 (i944).
L. & W. R. Co. v. Slocum, 299 N.Y. 496, 87 N.E. 2d 532 (i949), rev'd 339
U.S. 239 (195o); Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 210 S.C. 12, 41 S.E. 2d 774
(1947), rev'd 339 U.S. 255 (ig5o); Wooldridge v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 118 Colo. 25,
23326

26fDelaware,

I91 P. 2d 882 (1948); Coyle v. Erie R. Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 3o6, 59 A. 2d 817 (1948). Contra:
State ex rel. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Russell, 358 Mo. i.36, 219 S.W. 2d 34o (i949); see
Tharp v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 307 Ky. 322, 210 S.W. 2d 954 (1948).
'7 Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F. 2d 535 (C.A. 5 th, 1948); Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. v. Randolph, 164 F. 2d 4 (C.A. 8th, 1947); United States ex rel. Deavers v. Missouri-K.-T. R: Co.,
171 F. 2d 961 (C.A. 7th, 1949); Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (Mo., 1947); Griffin v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 88 F. Supp. 552 (II., 1949); Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. v. NRAB,
18 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. T65,8I4 (D.C. Ill.,
i95o); United R.R. Workers v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 89 F. Supp. 666 (Ill., i95o); see Starke v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., i8o F. 2d 569
(C.A. 7 th, ig5o); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. Co., i56 F. 2d i
(C.A. 8th, 1946). Contra: Randolph v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 1007 (Mo., 1946),
rev'd 164 F. 2d 4 (C.A. 8th, 1947); System Federation No. 91 v. Reed, z8o F. 2d 991 (C.A.
6th, z95o); Hughes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., i8 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 65,882 (D.C. Okla.,
z95o); see Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Slocum, 56 F. Supp. 634 (N.Y., 1944); Southern Ry.
Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 63 F. Supp. 306 (S.C., x945).
28 339 U.S. 239 (i95o).
29-339 U.S. 255 (95o).

3oSlocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S.

239,

244 (1950).

RLA, § 3 First (i), 48 Stat. i85 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i) (1943), quoted in
text at note i8 supra.
31
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the Court did recognize a common-law jurisdiction in the courts which would
survive the present decision. But judicial relief in disputes under collective
bargaining agreements has always been based on common-law grounds rather
than on the RLA.32 It can only be surmised that the Supreme Court intends to

limit the surviving "common-law" jurisdiction to the exact facts in the Moore
case, for otherwise the exception would be as broad as the rule.33 Unfortunately,
the tribunal which has been given such increased importance by this ruling is
unsatisfactory in many respects, and most of its decisions are immune from
judicial review under the RLA.
II
The NRAB consists of four separate tribunals, each with jurisdiction over
disputes involving members of certain crafts and classes specified in the RLA.34

Each tribunal, called a division, is composed of equal numbers of labor and
carrier representatives, who are chosen and paid by the national railroad labor
unions and the interstate railroads3 In the event that a division splits evenly
on a decision, a referee is brought in to vote with the division in making an
award3 6 The interests of the board members, although generally opposed and
balanced, make this government agency unique in both composition and operation, and is the source of most of its difficulties and disadvantages.37
3'Cases cited notes i9,
20 supra.

I

33 As to the legal merit of this decision, see the forceful dissenting opinion of Justice Reed
in the Slocum case, 339 U.S. 239, 245 (ig5o), quoted in part, note 107 infra. The Court purported to distinguish the Moore case as an ordinary common-law action for damages, as
opposed to suits for reinstatement, seniority rights, etc., which are not "common-law."
Such a distinction forgets that although rights under collective bargaining agreements were
expressly limited to damages in a few early cases-e.g., Hamilton v. Rouse, 178 App. Div. 8i,
165 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1917); Robinson v. Dahm, 94 N.Y. Misc. 729, x59 N.Y. Supp. 1o53
(x9x6)-equitable relief has been frequently sought and given. E.g., Gregg v. Starks, i88 Ky.
834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920); Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477,248 S.W. 10 4 2 (1923);
Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 18o Miss. 147, 177 So. 509 (937); Dooley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 13o N.J. Eq. 75, 21 A. 2d 334 (1941). It reads as a lone dissent from the
many federal court opinions stating that rights to equitable relief under collective bargaining
agreements do not arise out of the RLA but out of the common law. Cases cited note 20 supra.
And even where an award is obtained from the NRAB (according to the Supreme Court, on
the basis of the RLA), its enforceability will depend on the validity of the claim under the
common law, since the award is only entitled to prima facie weight in the enforcement proceeding, which is otherwise an ordinary civil suit. RLA § 3 First (p), 48 Stat. i185 (I934), 45
U.S.C.A. § i53 First (p) (i943); Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 16 F. Supp. 8io (Iowa,
1936); System Federation No. 59 v.Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 119 F. 2d 509 (C.A. 5th, i94I);
Hanks v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 63 F. Supp. x61 (N.Y., 1945). The right to an injunction to
enforce a collective-bargaining agreement is not affected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 37

Stat.

72

(1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1o8 (1947), prohibiting injunctions in "labor disputes." The

Act has been held to apply only to disputes over changes in agreements, not to enforcement of
existing contracts. See Comment, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 984, 985 (x949), and cases cited therein.
34 § 3 First (h), 48 Stat. xi85 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (h) (i943).
35Ibid., at (a), (b), (c), (g).

36Ibid., at (1).

37 For an invaluable inside account and criticism of the internal functioning of the NRAB,
see Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. 10, 77th Cong. ist Sess.
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The NRAB was originally envisaged as a sort of "supreme court" for the interpretation and application of labor agreements throughout the industry. Once
the large backlog of cases was disposed of and a body of precedents created,
the cases referred to the NRAB would dwindle to the few difficult ones not covered by existing precedents.38 In turn, only the most difficult of these would be
decided by a referee. However, the board members are not agreed as to their
function. As seen by the union men, the NRAB is an extension of the adjustment machinery on company property, and a place for horse-trading and compromise.39 Although the carrier members maintain that the NRAB was intended
to determine rights under the agreements in an impartial, quasi-judicial manner,
a process in which horse-trading and compromise have no place,4O the true
attitude of members of both groups is indicated by the fact that on the busy
First and Third Divisions a split in the vote of either bloc is virtually unknown.41 If a case comes up from a union which has a representative on the
division, the other labor members will normally be guided by his wishes.Y The
same practice prevails to a lesser extent on the carriers' side.43 Thus the merits
of a particular controversy have less effect on the alignment of division members than has its bearing on the running conflict between union and carrier
interests.44
The Second Division, handling a comparatively quiet part of the industry,
has disposed of its small volume of cases amicably and efficiently, and in conformity with precedent, which greatly facilitates adjustments on the property.4 s
But the First and Third Divisions, dealing with the most aggressive unions in the
Part IV (i94), which appears in an abridged form in Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. 8, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. i85 (i94i). A more emphatic and graphic
earlier draft, and other revealing materials, are contained in Jones, Inquiry of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure Relating to the National Railroad Adjustment Board (194I). See also Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board-A Unique
Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567 (1937); Spencer, The National Railroad Adjustment
Board (i938). These sources, the principal materials for the present comments on the NRAB's
internal operation, are all at least nine years old. But the conclusions drawn from them are
corroborated by more recent evidence as well. Indeed, the difficulties of the Board are so inextricable from its organization as determined by the RLA that significant improvement
would be most unlikely in the absence of legislative action.
38 Second Annual Report of the National Mediation Board 35 (1936).
39 Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. 1o, 77 th Cong. ist Sess.
Part IV, at 5 (1941). "Horse-trading" is probably the best word to describe the process of
grouping similar cases and balancing the awards. Rather than deadlock them all and risk having them all go to the opposition, each side agrees to concede some of the cases in exchange for
others. Thus the interest of the individual claimant is sacrificed to the objective of over-all
results, since all the claims might be found good if individually considered.
40 Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Sen. Doc. 10, 77 th Cong. ist Sess.
Part IV, at 18 (1941).
41Jones, op. cit. supra note 37, at

I51.

42Note 40 supra, at 17.

44 For example, see note 39 supra.

4' Ibid.

4s Note 40 supra, at 5.
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industry, have become forums for the expression of partisanship and carrierunion animosity. Invective and even challenges to fist-fights are more familiar
than the spirit of compromise, to say nothing of impartialty.46 Instead of
acquiescing in precedent, carrier members have been known to deadlock cases on
points which have been uniformly decided against them in as many as three
hundred previous cases, 47 and inconsistent awards and interpretations are not
unheard of.45 In view of the routine character of most NRAB business,49 the
atmosphere of antagonism provides the only possible explanation for the high,
and rising, percentage of deadlocked cases- s o
Having all these cases decided by referees involves disadvantages which have
been repeatedly noted by observers of NRAB activity.sr The referee is employed on a daily basis, has no tenure, and is liable to disqualification on complaint of either group on a division.52 Yet the job requires high intelligence, impartiality, and a thorough knowledge of railroad terminology and bargaining
agreements. Qualified men, unable to devote full time to the work, must
abandon it when their regular activities interfere, and rarely have the time to
become competent and efficient referees within their period of service.5 3 To add
to the difficulty, the First Division does not prepare opinions to accompany

its awards,54 and the opinions provided by other divisions are frequently inadequate,SS making reference to the case files a cumbersome necessity for the referee
in search of precedent. The unfortunate result is that a large number of NRAB
cases are decided by inexperienced and uninitiated referees.
46

Note 4o supra, at 5; Jones, op. cit. supra note 37, at 81.

47 Note 4o supra, at i9, 20.
48 Note 4o supra, at i9.
49It has been asserted that one group of 65o cases involved only 17 principles. Ibid., at 17.
5oThe fifteen year record for the whole board in 17,928 cases is 9,o86 decided without referee
and 8,842 (49%) decided with referee. In the first year the percentage of referee awards was
21%, in the isth year it was 77%. The fifteen-year proportion of deadlocks on the Third
Division is 82%. First Annual Report of the National Mediation Board (i935); Fifteenth
Annual Report of the National Mediation Board (i949).
51 Garrison, op. cit. supra note 37, at 593; Spencer, op. cit. supra note 37, at 22; Loomis,
Railway Labor Law-Practices and Problems, i6 I.C.C. Pract. J. 747, 754 ('949); Seventh
Annual Report of the National Mediation Board 46 (1941); Fifteenth Annual Report of the
National Mediation Board 13 (I949).
52 If a division can't agree on a referee, the Mediation Board appoints one. But it is reluctant to name unwanted men. So a complaint (usually of bias) made by either group on a division effectively disqualifies a referee from serving again with his accusers, regardless of the
merits of the accusation. Spencer, op. cit. supra note 37, at 24; Garrison, op. cit. supra note
37, at 59353In the fiscal year 194o, five of the ten referees who served were new to the job, and in
1941 the proportion was 20 of 35. Sixth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board 32
(i94o); Seventh Annual Report of the National Mediation Board 46 (1941).
54 Note 4o supra, at i8. However, referee opinions are written in about half of the deadlocked cases in this division.

ss Note 4o supra, at

i8.

COMMENTS
III

The bipartisan composition of the NRAB has also produced some important
procedural peculiarities. Although the RLA gives individual employees the
right to bring claims before the NRAB,56 the labor members, all paid union
representatives, have succeeded in preventing consideration of petitions
brought by employees under their own name, without representation by their
bargaining agent.S7 This means that dissenting members of the bargaining representative, members of minority unions and individuals who do not choose to
join any union or are ineligible because of race or otherwise, have no ready
access to the N-RAB unless the bargaining agent is willing to represent them
there s 8 And if a union which has undertaken to present a claim should settle it
and withdraw the case, the claimant is bound by the settlement as far as the
NRAB is concerned, even though he never consented to it.59 Thus the union
S6It is quite clear from the wording of the RLA that the individual claimant might bring
and control his claim. "[Dlisputes between an employee... and a carrier or carriers... may
be referred by petition of either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board.
...Parties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they
may respectively elect.... ." § 3 First (i), (j), 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i),
(j) (x943). See Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 7,x (1945); Patterson v. Chicago &
E. I. R. Co., So F. Supp. 334 (Ill., 1943); Starke v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., i8o F.
2d 569 (C.A. 7 th, 195o); McDermott v. New York Central R. Co., 32 F. Supp. 873 (N.Y.,
1940).

S7E.g., Burke v. Union Pac. R. Co., 129 F. 2d 844, 845 (C.A. ioth, 1942). Authority cited
note 40 supra, at 7. A few isolated cases on the Fourth Division involving employees who didn't
belong to an organized craft or class have been the only deviations from this practice. A
majority vote of the division is necessary to an assumption of jurisdiction. Since there is no
provision for appointment of referees to resolve procedural deadlocks, the invariable labor
dissent in these cases has the effect of a final refusal to consider the individual's claim. In one
case where a referee did decide the issue, the labor view triumphed. Rudd v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co., N.R.A.B. 3d Div., Award No. 1718 (1942). The labor view is
formally based on the RLA requirement that disputes be handled "in the usual manner" on
the property before they may be referred to the NRAB. § 3 First (i), 48 Stat. 1185 (1934),
45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i) (1943). The "usual manner," it is said, is by action of the bargaining
agent, not of the individual or of the minority union. Some unions have had the foresight to
insert provisions in the bargaining agreement that the elected representative shall have the
exclusive right to present grievances. This makes an inquiry into custom unnecessary. See
Rudd v.Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co., supra; 4o Ops. U.S. Att'y Gen. 254 (1942). But
the principle of the Elgin case would make such provisions invalid as against the public inter-

est. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945); see 4o Ops. U.S. Att'y Gen- 494 (1946);
cf. Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F. 2d 755 (App. D.C., 1949). The reasonwhy the practice is

so important to the represented labor unions is the incentive to union membership which results
from this requirement. In one instance where a division refused to allow a union other than the
bargaining agent to bring claims on behalf of its members, the union lost so many members
that its CIO charter was taken away. See United R.R. Workers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 89 F. Supp. 666, 668 (Ill., 195o).
ss Ibid.; see Starke v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., i8o F. 2d 569 (C.A. 7 th, 195o); authority cited note 40, at 7 n. 16 (1941).
s9 But see Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 718 (1945); Rogers v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 145 F. 2d I19, 121 (C.A. 9th, 1944). The Elgin case held that a union which was authorized by an employee to present a claim to the NRAB was not empowered to compromise it
without additional authorization. Generally stated, the theory of the case is that the claim
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bargaining agent is the keeper of the keys to NRAB relief, which has now become the only relief available anywhere. The ascendant union, having been
elected bargaining representative, can and does use its exclusive right of access
to the NRAB to consolidate its position vis-d-vis competing unions.6' This result is in direct conflict with the view taken by the Supreme Court in .Elgin,J. &
E. R. Co. v. Burley,6' that the bargaining agent's power to determine the rights
6
of members of the bargaining unit is limited to the making of the agreement, '
and that rights under an effective agreement belong to each member of the
unit independent of the desires of the elected representative. 3 In the past, an
employee who could not secure the cooperation of his bargaining agent, could
nevertheless get relief in the courts.4 This situation could be regarded as beyond
the scope of the Slocum rule, so that judicial relief might continue, or perhaps
the NRAB will be required to decide such cases.61 Otherwise the Slocum case
will result in the denial of remedy (and therefore of rights) to these employees.
belongs to the employee, and he is bound by union action (including presentation to the NRAB)
only to the extent he has consented to it. After the decision was handed down, the carrier
members on the First Division stated that unions which wanted to present claims would have
to show a power of attorney from the individual employees they were representing. At this the
labor members walked out, and the Division ceased to operate until the carrier men agreed to
abandon the position. Twelfth Annual Report of the National Mediation Board 64 (1946).
So the Elgin decision had no effect on the NRAB practice of regarding the claim as belonging
to the union rather than the individual. See Starke v. New York, C. &St. L. R. Co., i8o F. 2d
569, 573 (C.A. 7 th, ig5o). The courts have usually taken the Elgin view that the employee's
'rights under the collective bargaining agreement are independent of the union which made the
agreement. Starke v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., supra; Reynolds v. Denver & R. G. W. R.
Co., 174 F. 2d 673 (C.A. ioth, 1949); Kordewick v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 157 F. 2d
753 (C.A. 7 th, 1946); Gaskill v. Roth, 151 F. 2d 366 (C.A. 8th, 1945); Piercy v. Louisville &
N. Ry. Co., 198Sy. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923). Contra: Hughes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co.,
i8 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 65,882 (D.C. Okla., 195o) (union member was bound by union's interpretation of agreement).
6oE.g., see United R.R. Workers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 89 F. Supp. 666, 668 (Ill.,
1950), which describes how a minority union lost most of its membership and then its CIO
charter because it couldn't represent its members before the NRAB.
6X325 U.S. 711 (1945).
6

2

Ibid., at 733.

63Ibid., at 736.

6

4E.g., Rogers v. Union Pacific R. Co., 145 F. 2d 119 (C.A. 9th, i944). But refusal of the
NRAB to accept jurisdiction of a case has not made the case one arising under the RLA so as
to qualify it for federal jurisdiction in the absence of diversity. McDermott v. New York
Central R. Co., 32 F. Supp. 873 (N.Y., i94o); Burke v. Union Pacific R. Co., 129 F. 2d 844
(C.A. zoth, 1942). However, these cases were decided at a time when the state courts were

still available.
6

There is a precedent for such a procedure. Patterson v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 5o F. Supp.
129 F. 2d ii (C.A. 7 th, 1942).
However, labor members might walk out (as they did after the Elgin decision, see note 59
supra), if the procedure became commonplace. Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies, Sen. Doc. io, 7 7 th Cong. ist Sess. Part IV, at 1o (1941). More important would be
the claimant's poor chances of getting a fair hearing, since he would start out with the labor
members against him and the carrier members motivated by a contrary interest. See Edwards
v. Capital Airlines, 176 F. 2d 755 (App. D.C., 1949).
5

334 (I1., 1943); cf. Delaware & Hudson R. Corp. v. Williams,

COMMENTS

The RLA limits the jurisdiction of the NRAB to "disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers .... ."66 Although the NRAB
67
recognizes that this provision does not include disputes between employees,
it disposes of certain of them anyway. 6 Some courts have asserted that the
NRAB has no jurisdiction in inter-employee disputes,6 9 and have occasionally
denied the force of res judicata to NRAB awards which attempted to dispose of
them.7o However, the Supreme Court may have accepted the view that the
NRAB can deal with inter-employee disputes, since both the Slocum and Pitney
cases involved controversies between two unions. But neither case is by any
means a square holding on the point,7' and it is to be hoped that the courts will
be permitted to continue to take these cases, since the NRAB is so ill-suited to
deal with them. The seniority dispute, the employee-bargaining agent dispute,
and the inter-union jurisdictional dispute are the most frequent types encountered. A glance at each will disclose its importance to the collective bargaining system, the inadequacy of its treatment by the NRAB, and the evil of
the Slocum rule should it result in denying access to the courts in these cases.
Seniority rights give a measure of security in one's employment, a thing of
increasing value as the worker gets older and new jobs become harder for him
to obtain. When a man asserts seniority rights under a contract, he is of necessity claiming a preference over other employees and placing their own seniority
66

§ 3 First (i), 48 Stat. ix85 ('934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (i) (1943).

67See Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 509, 58 A. 2d 729, 733 (1948); Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. Co., 156 F. 2d x, s (C.A. 8th, 1946).
68 See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Clinchifield R. Co., N.R.A.B. 3 d Div., Award No. 844
('939). The carrier members of the NRAB have always maintained that interested employees
should be notified in seniority claims, but this contention has been rejected by labor members
and referees on the theory that the NRAB only deals with union-carrier disputes. But a
seniority dispute is so obviously not a union-carrier controversy that the labor members can
only be using the argument of limited jurisdiction to take advantage of nonunion interests by
excluding them from proceedings in which they have an important stake. If the labor members
were consistent in applying the limitation they would not accept a seniority dispute in the first
place.
69 Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 509, 58 A. 2d 729, 733 (1948); Longv. Van Osdale, 26

N.E. 2d 69, 74 (Ind. App., 1940); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry.
Co., i56 F. 2d x, 5 (C.A. 8th, 1946); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
60 F. Supp. 263, 274 (La., 1945), rev'd 159 F. 2d 822 (C.A. 5 th, 1947); Stephenson v. New
Orleans & N. E. R. Co., X8o Miss. 147, i66, 177 So. 509, 514 (1937). But see United States ex
rel. Deavers v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., i7i F. 2d 961, 963 (C.A. 5 th, 1949).
70 Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 18o Miss. 147, 177 So. 509 (1937); Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. Co., i56 F. 2d i (C.A. 8th, 1946); Griffin v.
Gulf & Ship Island R. Co., i98 Miss. 458, 21 So. 2d 814 (1945).
71 Because the law is not clear on whether the type of dispute involved is actually one between employee groups or strictly a union-carrier affair (see text at note 85 infra) these decisions need not have been intended to apply to clear-cut inter-employee controversies. But
the language of the Slocum opinion is indicative of a strong inclination to expand NRAB
jurisdiction to all cases involving contract interpretations and applications in the railroad
industry. The seniority dispute is a classic inter-employee controversy under this general
heading, and one which the NRAB has been deciding since its inception.
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rights in jeopardy. As a rule, the carrier has no interest in such a dispute. The
real parties in interest are the individual employees immediately affected. As
this dispute comes before the NRAB, the union bargaining agent is petitioning
for relief against the carrier on behalf of certain employees.72 But the men who
would be adversely affected by an award for these employees will not be notified or heard by the NRAB, due to the stand taken by its union members.73
The courts, in contrast, hold that employees adversely affected by a seniority
claim have property (seniority rights) at stake which may not be taken from
them without due notice and hearing; and they have repeatedly held NRAB
awards invalid for failure to comply with these requirements.74
When an employee, union or nonunion, has a grievance against the bargaining agent, he is without a spokesman before the NRAB and cannot hope for
72E.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Clinchfield R. Co., N.R.A.B. 3d Div., Award No. 844
(1939).
73Carrier respondents and carrier members have often moved to notify and hear these other
employees. But the labor panel has always voted the opposite way, resulting in a deadlock and
inaction. Their reasoning is set out in note 68 supra. See also Hutcheson, J., concurring in
result in Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. 2d 768, 774 (C.A. 5 th, I937). The result of the
practice is that the union bargaining agent is unopposed in NRAB proceedings by the only
people who stand to lose by an award to the union. It.should also be remembered that these
other employees cannot bring their own claims to the NRAB without the active cooperation
of the same bargaining agent which is here opposing them.
74 Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. 2d 481 (C.A. 7 th, 1936); Watson v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 173
S.W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943) (enforcement of awards enjoined); R.R. Yardmasters v.
Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 914 (Ind., x947) (enforcement denied); see Lane v.
Union Terminal Co., 12 F. Supp. 204 (Tex., 1935); Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. 2d
768 (C.A. 5th, 1937); cf. Primakow v. Ry. Express Agency, 56 F. Supp. 413 (Wis., 943);
Brand v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 22 F. Supp. 569 (Pa., 1938) (awards of system boards enjoined).
But see R.R. Yardmasters v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 3 9 F. Supp. 876 (Ohio, ig4o), where
a suit for injunction against enforcement of an award was dismissed because there was no
provision for such an attack under the RLA. The court said that the plaintiff would have the
right to intervene in the enforcement proceeding, but note that if the carrier voluntarily
complies with the award, there will be no enforcement proceeding.
While the courts agree that seniority rights under an existing contract are property rights,
a change in the agreement which results in altering them is not a violation of due process,
so that union activities in negotiating a new agreement are not subject to due process
limitations in favor of individual employees. Division 525 v. Gorman, 133 F. 2d 279
(C.A. 8th, 1943); Austin v. Southern Pacific Co., 5o Cal. App. 2d 292, 123 P. 2d 33
(1942); Wooldridge v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 1i8 Colo. 25, 191 P. 2d 882 (1948).
Whether the rights are to be lodked on as property rights in the constitutional sense
or not, the fact remains that they are f-tremendous importance to individual employees
and it is manifestly unfair to give unions the power to nullify an individual's seniority rights
under a continuing agreement. Changes in the bargaining agreement which affect individual
rights might be justified on the ground that the union must be free to represent the interest
of the majority of the bargaining unit as it sees fit. But no reason appears why the majority
should have anything to say about an individual employee's rights already accrued under an
existing agreement. See note iog infra. Yet under the present NRAB setup the union can decide which seniority grievances shall be heard by the NRAB, and prosecute the ones it chooses
without opposition from employees adversely affected. Since the Slocum case, the employee
whose union doesn't like his complaint (or him) has no forum at all in which to seek relief.
Members of the bargaining unit are left at the mercy of their bargaining agent. See Starke v.
New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., X8o F. 2d 569 (C.A. 7 th, 1950).

COMMENTS

relief from it.75 Yet discrimination by representative unions against nonunion
men, and their own members as well, is a frequent phenomenon in the field.76
The problem is especially pressing in the case of Negroes, who cannot join many
of the national unions.77 Fireman Tunstall was able to persuade a court to
enjoin the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen from negotiating a discriminatory agreement with the carrier,78 but this was outside NRAB
jurisdiction. Suppose he should discover that the union was discriminating in
keeping the seniority lists under a nondiscriminatory contract. Under a literal
reading of the Slocum opinion, exclusive jurisdiction of this complaint would
be in the NRAB, First Division, the labor members of which are paid by allwhite unions,"9 including this same Brotherhood. Even if Tunstall, although
necessarily without union representation, could succeed in compelling the
NRAB to consider his case, he would start out with the five labor men against
him. Whether the case even got as far as a referee would depend solely on the
interest or mood of the carrier members. And should the decision go against
Tunstall, there would be no way of obtaining judicial review under the RLA as
currently interpreted.10 Unless the courts are given original or appellate jurisdiction, perhaps on the same constitutional basis as in the Steele8 and Tunstall
cases, the purpose of those decisions will be frustrated, for bargaining agents in
applying a contract will be able to accomplish with impunity discrimination
which is enjoinable if attempted at the negotiation stage. The courts have had
7s See Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 5o2, 58 A. 2d 729 (1948); Griffin v. Gulf & Ship Island
21 So. 2d 814 (i945); text at note 56 supra.
76 Discrimination against nonunion men: Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 58 A. 2d 729
(1948); System Federation No. 91 v. Reed, i8o F. 2d 991 (C.A. 6th, ig5o); Griffin v. Gulf &
Ship Island R. Co., i98 Miss. 458, 21 So. 2d 814 (1945); Long v. Van Osdale, 26 N.E. 2d
69 (Ind. App., 194o) (all involving union practices in maintaining seniority lists). Complaints
against union by its own members: Dooley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 13o N.J. Eq. 75, 21 A. 2d

R. Co., 198 Miss. 458,

334 (I94r); Capra v. Local Lodge No. 273, 102 Colo. 63, 76 P. 2d 738 (1938); Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923).

These are cases dealing with practices under an existing contract. They are not cited as
proof of the strong tendency toward discrimination, which is more evident from materials
cited note 77 infra, but they do show the possibilities for abuses in applying a nondiscriminatory agreement.
77 See

Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S.

192

(r944); 56 Yale L.J. 731 (947), noting

Betts v. Easley, x6z Kan. 459, 169 P. 2d 831 (1946); Summers, The Right to Join a Union,
47 Col. L. Rev. 33 (947).
Because the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen wouldn't accept Negroes as members,
Negro brakemen were forced to organize independently. Now B.R.T. pressure to get all braking work for its all-white membership is resulting in a bitter and protracted jurisdictional
dispute involving the Brotherhood and numerous Negro unions.
73 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (i944).
79Brotherhood of tKR. Trainmen, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Order of Ry. Conductors, and Switchmen's Union
of North America. See Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F. 2d 535, 536 n. 2(10) (C.A. 5 th, 1949).
8oSee text at note 1o infra.

8,Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,

323 U.S. 192 (944).
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no difficulty in dealing with these cases,' once again supplying a need not met
by the NRAB.
Union pressure to expand into job areas occupied by other unions sometimes
results in a contract which purports to govern employment already covered by
another agreement. 83The carrier complies with the new agreement 8 4and thereby incurs the dissatisfaction of the union which made the older contract. As it
comes before the NRAB, such a dispute is in the form of one or two unioncarrier controversies. The claims of each union under its contract are considered
as independent demands on the carrier. If both agreements cover the same work,
two awards may issue, and the carrier must change one of the agreements to
remove the overlap if it wishes to cease paying twice for the same work. 8s But
the NRAB will not attempt to decide which union has jurisdiction over the
work and the right to contract for it. It limits itself to the application of agreements which have in fact been made, without attempting to resolve conflicts
between them or to determine who shall contract for the work in the future.
The courts have taken various views in such jurisdictional disputes. Like
the NRAB, some say the controversy over who has the right to contract for the
work is not justiciable and must be worked out by unions and carrier through
negotiation and bargaining." Other courts have given relief, basing it on the
theory of interference with advantageous relations, and giving the disputed
jobs to the union originally having jurisdiction over them.8 7However, the court
Cases cited note 8 supra.
The most prominent example of this is the nationwide campaign of the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen to take braking work from members of various Negro unions. See Howard
v.Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (Mo., 1947); Randolphv. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 007
(Mo., 1946); Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F. 2d 535 (C.A. 5 th, 1948). For other areas of interunion friction see Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. Co., 61 F. Supp.
869 (Mo., 1945) (Telegraphers and Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks); Illinois Central R. Co.
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 83 F. Supp. 93o (I1., 1949) (Trainmen and Order of Ry.
Conductors).
s4 This may be done because of the same pressure which caused the carrier to make the
agreement (usually the case when work is taken from lower-paid Negroes) or because the
carrier can effect economies through job combinations under the new agreement.
8s "[The NRAB] can not alter an agreement for the relief of either [carrier or union], even
though it might appear that the work was also covered by an agreement with [another union].
...We see no way in which this Board ... could save a carrier who has executed two agreements, the scope rule of which agreements covers the same work; nor do we believe it was the
intention of the Congress... to permit the employes covered by one such agreement to
intervene and be heard in a claim filed before this Board by the employes covered by the other
agreement." Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Gulf Coast Lines, N.R.A.B. 3d Div., Award
No. 2253 (943).
86 This is the view on the fifth and eighth circuits, which refer complaints of this type to the
NRAB, understanding that the NRAB will not 9ttempt to remove the overlap but merely
make the carrier perform each contract according to its terms. Hampton v. Thompson, z71 F.
2d 535 (C.A. 5 th, 1948); Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. v. Randolph, 164 F. 2d 4 (C.A. 8th, 1947);
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. Co., 61 F. Supp. 869 (Mo., 1945),
rev'd on other grounds 156 F. 2d i (C.A. 8th, 1946).
s7 Randolph v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 1007 (Mo., 1946), noted 6o Harv. L.
Rev. 832 (1947), rev'd 164 F. 2d 4 (C.A. 8th, 1947); Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
171 F. ad 594 (C.A. 7 th, 1948).
82
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may require the parties to have their separate contract rights determined by
the NRAB before coming into court.8 If this requirement is continued, the
Negro unions, which have the most frequent cause to complain, may be unable
to get relief because of bias on the First Division, which has jurisdiction of most
of the areas which concern them. 89Other courts maintain that the NRAB has
exclusive jurisdiction in this type of case,90 but it appears that some of these,
at least, are unaware of the treatment given such cases by the NRAB, which
does not recognize a conflict between the two unions. Although it stated that the
NRAB had exclusive jurisdiction of the dispute, one court enjoined enforcement of the ensuing NRAB awards because each was made in the presence
of only one of the unions, and therefore failed to accord due process to the
absent union. 9" Implicit in such action, also taken by other courts, 92 is the view
that there is a justiciable controversy over the right to contract for the work in
question. Although the Supreme Court held in the Slocum case that the NRAB
had exclusive primary jurisdiction of a jurisdictional dispute, the Court did not
make an explicit endorsement of the agency's procedure in treating this type
of case. In view of the conflict in lower court cases it is unlikely that the Court
would have left such an endorsement implicit if it had been intended. If the
issue were directly considered, it seems probable that the Court would hold
the National Mediation Board, not the NRAB, to have exclusive jurisdiction
over the right to contract, pursuant to the NMB's power to determine the class
93
or craft which shall be represented by a bargaining agent.
8, Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
New Orleans, T. &M. Ry. Co., r56 F. 2d i (C.A. 8th, 1946); Griffin v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
88 F. Supp. 552 (IIl., '949).
99See Hampton v. Thompson, r71 F. 2d 535, 536 n. 2(10) (C.A. 5th, 1948). The First

Division labor members are all representatives of all-white unions (listed note 79 supra).
90 Cases cited note 86 supra; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 83 F.
Supp. 930 (I1., 1949); In re Central R. Co. of N.J., 145 F. 2d 35i (C.A. 3d, 1944), modified
sub nom. Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946); Hampton v. Thompson
171 F. 2d 535 (C.A. 5 th, 1948).
9'1Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. v. NRAB, z8 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 65,814 (D.C. Ill., Ig5o). The
parties were sent back to the NRAB for a rehearing with both unions present, but the Board
has since declined to grant this, and the court now has the case again.
92Templeton v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 84 F. Supp. 162 (Mo., 1949), aff'd sub nom.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 F. 2d 527 (C.A. 8th, i95o); Griffin v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 88 F. Supp. 552 (Ill., 1949).
93 Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943); RLA § 2 Ninth,
48 Stat. iS5, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 Ninth (z943).
Under the RLA, the National Mediation Board has the function of determining the class or
craft which is to be represented by a single bargaining agent and governed by its contract. If
these classes are determined by kind of employment rather than union affiliation (and they
should be) it would appear that two unions could not both be qualified to contract for the
same work on the same road. The proper scope of a contract should be the class or craft as
determined by the Mediation Board, not the scope agreement contained in particular contracts. Once the bargaining unit is determined, the elected representative is under a duty not
to discriminate against anyone in it, Negro or white, union member or unaffiliated employee.
Steele v. Louisville &N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). This line of reasoning was suggested to
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IV
In view of the adventitious character of NRAB determinations, it is unfortunate that they should be given the finality which the law now requires. The
RLA provides that NRAB decisions shall be final and binding,94 and makes no
provision for court review except in a suit for enforcement of an award granting relief. The "final and binding" provision does not apply to the enforcement
suit, 95 which proceeds "as other civil suits, except that ...the findings and
order of the [NRAB] shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
...96Thus the only person who can bring a decision of the NRAB into court
under the RLA is the plaintiff who wins an award. The defendant, always a
carrier, can have judicial review only if the claimant sues to enforce, and must
decline to comply in order to bring this about. 97 In so doing it risks accrual of
two years' damages in the event the beneficiaries of the award wait the statutory limit before filing suit for enforcement.95 Some unions have made it a
practice to coerce compliance by threat of strike, thus avoiding an enforcement
proceeding and the possibility of reversal of an NRAB decision in their favor. 99
Carriers have attempted, without success, to obtain judicial review on their
own motion by suit for declaratory judgment. ° °
the courts in Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (Mo., 1947), but has not yet been worked
out in detail, partly because many of the courts are still preoccupied with the role of the
NRAB in treating these cases.
94§ 3 First (m), 48 Stat. i85 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (m) (i943).
9SDahlberg v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 138 F. 2d 121 (C.A. 3d, 1943). There is no express limitation on the provision except in the case of money awards, but how these are to be
treated differently is not set out.
96§ 3 First (p), 48 Stat. i185 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (p) (1943). The weight given
the NRAB award varies from court to court. But the general rule is that the enforcement proceeding is a trial de novo, and the claim must have a basis in law independent of the award if
enforcement is to be given. Trial de novo: Order of Sleeping Car Conductors v. Pullman Co.,
47 F. Supp. 599 (Wis., 1942); Hanks v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 63 F. Supp. i6i (N.Y., i945);
Swift v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 84 F. Supp. ii6 (Iowa, I944). Independent basis in law:
Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., i6 F. Supp. 8io (Iowa, 1936); System Federation No. 59
v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 3o F. Supp. 909 (La., i94o), aff'd ii9 F. 2d 5o9 (C.A. 5th, i941);
Dahlberg v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 138 F. 2d 121 (C.A. 3d, 1943). Thus in spite of the
"final and binding" provision, a district court may reverse an NRAB decision on the merits.
97 This has been held not to deny due process to the carrier. The opportunity to defend in the
suit for enforcement is deemed a sufficient safeguard to the carrier. Washington Terminal Co.
v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235 (App. D.C., 1941); Cook v. Des Moines Ry. Co., i6 F. Supp. 8io
(Iowa, 1936).
98See Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235, 247 (App. D.C., 1941); RLA § 3
First (g), 48 Stat. 185 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (g) (x943).
99 See Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235, 246 (App. D.C., 1941); Shipley
v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 83 F. Supp. 722, 761 (Pa., 1949); Garrison, op. cit. supra note
37, at 591 n. 94o Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235, 245 (App. D.C., [941); New Orleans
P. B. R. Comm'n v. Ward, 182 F. 2d 654 (C.A. 5 th, i95o).
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In a more serious position is the claimant who is denied relief by the NRAB.
Since he has no award to enforce, there is no RLA provision under which he can
bring the decision into court, and the "final and binding" stipulation has been
held to preclude an original court suit.0I Although the constitutionality of this
limitation has been occasionally questioned, 0 2 claimants have repeatedly been
refused judicial consideration of claims already rejected by the NRAB.10 3 The
only direct pronouncements by the Supreme Court, both in minority opinions,
also took this view.o4 These cases were decided on the theory that originally
the claimant could have chosen to sue in court intead of submitting the case
to the NRAB, so that even if NRAB procedure were lacking in due process, the
claimant would be estopped to complain of it. Under the new ruling that the
NRAB has exclusive primary jurisdiction, this rationale is no longer available,
and a reconsideration of the constitutionality of the RLA review provisions
should be forthcoming. And as Justice Reed pointed out in his Slocum dissent,
the NRAB lacks characteristics and procedures which are essential in a tribunal
capable of making unreviewable adjudications under traditional standards of
fairness and due process. 0 5
xol Cases cited note io3 infra. But it is hard to see why NRAB decisions againsta claimant
should be entitled to absolute finality when decisions for claimant by the identical tribunal
are worth only prima facie weight in the reviewing court.
It has been suggested by Holly, J., inHargis v. Wabash R. Co., 163 F. 2d 6o8, 61i (C.A. 7 th,
1947), that adverse decisions of the NRAB are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act § zo(e), 6o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § zoog(e) (Supp., i949). However, "agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of the
parties to the disputes determined by them" are excluded from the review provisions of the
Act, Ibid., at § 2(a) and § zooi(a). Furthermore, statutes precluding judicial review take
precedence over the review provisions. Ibid., at § io and § ioo9. And an explicit statutory
prohibition is not necessary. A judicial decision that the statute so operates (of which there
have been many on this point; see note io3 infra) is sufficient. Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 167 F. 2d 529 (App. D.C., 1948).
'-Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235, 245 (App. D.C., 1941); Watson v.
Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 173 S.W. 2d 357, 362 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943); Dahberg v. Pittsburgh &
L. E. R. Co., 138 F. 2d 121, 123 (C.A. 3d, 1943).
103 Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (Mo., 1942); Hecox v. Pullman Co., 85 F.
Supp. 34 (Wash., 1949); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 75 F. Supp. 740 (Ohio, 1948);

Williams v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 356 Mo. 967, 204 S.W. 2d 693 (1947), cert. den. 333
U.S. 854 (1948); Hargis v. Wabash R. Co., 163 F. 2d 6o8 (C.A. 7th, 1947), noted 96 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 429 (1948); Reynolds v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 174 F. 2d 673 (C.A. zoth, 1949);
Austin v. Southern Pacific Co., 5o Cal. App. 2d 292, 123 P. 2d 39 (1942). But compare Rogers
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 145 F. 2d xig (C.A. 9th, 1944); see opinion of Holly, D. I., in Hargis v.
Wabash R. Co. supra; dissenting opinion of Stephens, J., in Washington Terminal Co. v.
Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235, 269 (App. D.C., 1941); cf. Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F. 2d 755
(App. D.C., 1949).
104 Opinion of justice Frankfurter (concurred in by three others) in Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 749 (1945), citing Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (Mo.,
1942), with approval; opinion of justice Reed in Slocum v. Delaware, L. &W. R. Co., 339 U.S.
239, 252 (19so), noting the same line of decisions, but with alarm. The view is also manifested
in the denial of certiorari in a case which squarely raised this issue, Williams v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 356 Mo. 967, 204 S.W. 2d 693 (1947), cert. den. 333 U.S. 854 (1948).
X05
Note 107 infra.
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V
There is a need for a special tribunal to deal with disputes under railroad collective-bargaining agreements because of the large volume of cases, and the
desirability of having the agreements uniformly and expertly interpreted and
applied from case to case. But the NRAB as presently constituted is unfit to
deal adequately with many types of disputes in the field. The bipartisan panel
settles cases by compromise rather than on the merits, and many of the deadlocks are resolved by inexperienced referees. The NRAB limits claimants to
those who can obtain representation by their bargaining agent, and favors the
represented employees in treating inter-employee disputes. Many of the inequalities caused by these characteristics were mitigated by the availability of
judicial relief. To the extent that the Slocum case will restrict resort to the courts
it will magnify the consequences of these deficiencies and detract from the
adequacy of the pre-existing overall NRAB-court treatment of these cases.
However, the courts can help to safeguard interests left unprotected by the
Slocum rule by taking cases which the NRAB declines to accept and by allowing judicial review of NRAB decisions against petitioner, which are not otherwise reviewable under the RLA. °e It would seem that the NRAB in its present
form could not treat inter-employee disputes so as to satisfy judicial requirements of due process. Even if the Board gave notice and hearing to all interested
parties, the represented union interest would have a great advantage because
of the composition of the tribunal.Io° Perhaps original resort or removal to the
courts will be permitted in this limited class of cases as well. Such a system
06"[The Court] must in the future build up a complex system of review, or it must say that
Congress intended to leave the rights of many individuals and organizations to the unreviewable discretion of a privately selected board.... This Court may be hard put to protect the
rights of minorities under these circumstances." Justice Reed, dissenting in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 252-54 (195o).
107Justice Reed, dissenting in Slocum v. Delaware, L. &W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 252 (195o),
said: "ITihe Court says that Congress has forced the parties into a forum that has few of the
attributes of a court, but which may be the final judge of the rights of individuals.... When
Congress has created ... administrative agencies and special courts [with great sweep], it
has carefully outlined their powers, provided stated protections for individual rights, and has
furnished neutral officials. But here, although none of these protections have been provided,
the Court finds an underlying purpose in Congress to abolish, without discussion, judicial
jurisdiction. When an administrative body varies so markedly from the kind which experience
has shown may safely be given final power over people's rights, it should not be assumed that
Congress intended the primary jurisdiction of the Board to be exclusive.... The decision of
the Court places it in a dilemma of its own creation-it must in the future build up a complex
system of review, or it must say that Congress intended to leave the rights of many individuals
and organizations to the uureviewable discretion of a privately selected board."
See Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F. 2d 755 (App. D.C., 1949), in which nonunion employees sued in court for reinstatement after a bipartisan system board set up under the
RLA had dismissed the complaint. The union bargaining agent had actively opposed the plalntiff in the hearings before the system board. The carrier was not interested in the dispute.
Although there was no RLA provision for it in such a case, the court said that plaintiffs were
entitled to judicial review because the administrative remedies did not adequately guarantee
a fair hearing in this case, since half the members of the tribunal were union members, and
the carrier members had no stake in the controversy.
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would fail to realize the Supreme Court's objective of uniform treatment of railroad collective-bargaining agreements, but the NRAB, too, is not beyond reproach in this respect. Outweighing this disadvantage is the desirability, if not
necessity, of ensuring a fair hearing and equal justice to all employees.
Uniformity and fairness could both be achieved under the Slocum rule were
the NRAB reconstituted as an impartial tribunal"'8 It could combine the procedural and adjudicative advantages of a court with the specialized knowledge
of an administrative agency. It could provide a hearing for third parties and
accept inter-employee disputes without upsetting the balance of interests among
its members. It could follow precedents and render consistent interpretations,
and it could decide all the cases on their merits. It could dispense with the
present time-consuming practice of rearguing deadlocked cases before referees.
The carrier members have always favored such a tribunal, but the labor
members are opposed.-09 One reason for their opposition is clear-under the
present set-up, the unions they represent enjoy important advantages over
competing unions. But the interest of railway labor as a whole must lie with an
impartial administration of collective bargaining agreements rather than with
a system which operates to the advantage of vested union interests1o In the
absence of such a sweeping legislative reform, the Supreme Court in the Slocum
case would seem to have done collective bargaining in the railroad industry a
distinct disservice.
SPECIAL FINDINGS AND GENERAL VERDICTS
THE RECONCILIATION DOCTRINE
Legal philosophy has retreated from its former exaltation of trial by jury
as the bulwark of Anglo-American jurisprudence' to a new position, from
x08
A system of labor courts has been proposed, but their jurisdiction was to include compulsory arbitration of disputes over new contracts as well as enforcement of existing agreements. See Vickery, Labor Relations Law: The Ferguson-Smith Bill to Create Labor Courts,
33 A.B.A.J. 548 (1947).
lo9
Jones, op. cit. supra note 37, at 115.

10For contrary views see authority cited note 4o supra, at 9; Collective Bargaining,
Grievance Adjustment, and the Rival Union, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (195o).
The former authority suggests that effective majority rule may require that the interests
of the majority govern the disposition of adjustments as well as the negotiation of new agreements. On this theory the man at the head of the seniority list would not be entitled to complain if removed, because his removal benefits all the employees below him on the list. It
should be added that this authority also states the arguments against exclusive right in the
bargaining agent to represent employees in adjustment proceedings, and makes no final
choice between the two alternatives. In Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945)

the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the theory that the RLA conferred such an exclusive
right on the elected bargaining agent.
xNote in this connection, the classic statement of Blackstone: 'hen the jury have delivered in their verdict, and it is recorded in court, they are then discharged. And so ends the
trial by jury; which ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the
English law." 3 Bl. Comm. *378.

